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Introduction
Since the 2009 BRIC/SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, 
Russia has increasingly identified itself as a BRIC country. 
At that time, president Medvedev expressed dissatisfaction 
with the transatlantic system of rotating the IMF chair-
manship between the EU and the USA, the status of the 
dollar as a world currency, and the discrepancy between 
share of votes in the IMF and actual financial contribu-
tions. The now former Russian president noted then that 
the ‘BRIC summit should create conditions for a more 
just world order […]’.1 Also President Vladimir Putin has 
mooted ideas about a shifting world order, indicating that 
Russia should meet the ‘Asia century’ by cultivating exten-
sive relations to China and by balancing US unipolarity.2 
Statements aside, several questions are evident: Is Russia 
in fact a BRIC country? Does it have the resources and the 
desire to play a role in what the Russian media have called 
‘a constellation of letters’? 
BRIC and status: Russian politics and the economy
The BRIC concept was originally all about economic growth, 
and not a vehicle for the promotion of foreign policies. True, 
there is a lot to gain for aspiring status seekers to embrace 
the concept. The Goldman Sachs Foundation asserted that 
the BRIC countries would outpace the US economy by 
2018 and that the economy of Brazil alone would overtake 
that of Italy.3 Any suggestions that power was moving from 
the West to the East were circumstantial, however, as the 
Sachs Foundation also opined that a new middle class would 
emerge and put its imprint on spending patterns, with in-
creased competition for resources as a result. Hence, in 2010 
it could be assumed that for Russia to fit into this pattern, 
the rising Russian middle class would have to be accommo-
dated politically under conditions of sustainable economic 
growth. Moreover, the modernization and innovation drive 
of Medvedev would have to deliver concrete results – diver-
sifying Russian exports away from energy and conventional 
arms, and opening doors to investment from abroad. 
At the onset of 2012, Russia appeared to be more like a stum-
bling BRIC. First, the 2011 Russian Duma elections revealed 
that many voters from the generation that has benefited 
from the Putin stabilization drive have come to reject Putin’s 
candidacy for another 6 years. The system of ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ sustained by a dominant state-sponsored 
political bloc and the Medvedev–Putin tandem is once more 
being replaced by a dominant presidential system with lean-
ings towards authoritarianism.4 Second, Medvedev’s long-
promised modernization and innovation drive never encom-
passed political liberalization: it unfolded within the BRIC 
context as a means of attracting new investments to Russia. 
The latter failed to materialize, and Russia now faces a series 
of contradictions as regards both the structure of its exports 
to BRIC countries, and its own role as a BRIC country. 
The major source of these contradictions is the 2008 eco-
nomic crisis. In the period leading up to the elections, the 
Russian economy experienced the highest capital flight 
among the BRICs. In August 2011 alone, USD 500 million 
was taken out of Russian investment funds, and the drop 
continued.5 The Russian Ministry of Finance estimated cap-
ital flight for 2011 to more than USD 80 billion, and that 
major capital investment cannot be expected before 2013.6 
In the course of one week in September 2011 alone, inves-
tors withdrew USD 315 million from Russian capital market 
portfolios, double the capital flight from China and India for 
that week, with Brazil attracting USD 30 million.7 Indeed, 
the Russian press has also indicated that the Goldman Sachs 
prognosis of a lower global growth rate for 2012/2013 has 
made Russia look like an outsider within BRIC.8 Also in oth-
4 Medvedev’s promises of post-electoral appeasement such as 
greater flexibility for registering parties and presidential can-
didates had a hollow ring as the presidential campaign around 
Putin unfolded. Police and bureaucratic clampdowns on dem-
onstrations have continued throughout the first part of 2012, 
reaching a peak at Putin’s inauguration in May 2012. 
5  Kommersant, 26 August 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1758355
6 Reuters, 30 November 2011, at: http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/11/30/russia-inflows-idUSL5E7MU31W20111130 
7  Kommersant, 19 September 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1776559
 8  Kommersant, 10 January 2012, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1848183. 
1 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 17 June 2009, at: http://www.
rg.ru/2009/06/17/brik.html 
2 Ziegler (2009: 140).
3 ‘Is this the BRICs decade?’, May 20, 2010, at:  http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/brics-decade.html
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er sectors where the BRICs have been excelling, Russia falls 
short. On the ITK development index, measuring the use 
of internet technologies in government, among companies 
and in society, Russia is in 77th place, after India, China and 
Brazil, and even below Kazakhstan.9 In sum, as the journal 
Kommersant claimed already in 2010, with average growth 
rates between 3 and 4 per cent, one could easily dismiss the 
term BRIC as a ‘diversion in the world of imperialism’.10
       
Russia and the Other BRICs 
Russia’s relationship to the other BRICs reveals an uneven 
and contradictory pattern. Starting out in 2010, President 
Medvedev sought to transform Brazil into a Russian 
bridgehead in Latin America. This had a domestic policy 
dimension: Medvedev wished to diversify contacts struck by 
Igor Sechin with the Chavez regime, and to utilize Brazil 
to flag the importance of the BRIC constellation.11 Russia 
pledged to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat in the 
UNSC and an agreement to open direct dialogue between 
the countries’ MFAs. Agreements on intellectual property 
and information security were signed, and a scientific-
technical framework for cooperation was discussed.
In spite of being a major oil exporter, Russia had little to 
offer, however. Rather, the technology sought by Brazil for 
offshore was precisely the same that Russia covets for its 
own purposes in the Arctic. Also Medvedev’s announced 
‘technological alliance’ with Brazil, intended to encom-
pass transfer of technology and bilateral joint ventures in 
high-tech innovation parks, seemed remote from realities. 
In 2009, Russia’s trade with Brazil was USD 4.6 billion, 
down from 6.7 billion 2008; 85 per cent of this was fertiliz-
ers, and 2.7 per cent machine products. For Brazil, export 
to Russia was 94 per cent fertilizers.12 As for arms trade, in 
2008, Brazil signed a contract worth USD 300 million for 
the purchase of Mi-35 attack choppers from Russia. Brazil 
received 6 of a total order of 12 in 2009/2010.13 By 2011, how-
ever, Brazil was debating whether to cancel the delivery of 
12 choppers, due to slashes in the defence budget.14 Indeed, 
Brazil is in no way a traditional arms trade partner for Rus-
sia. In the period 2003–2007, 64 per cent of Brazil’s arms 
came from Europe, 17 from the USA, and 7 per cent from 
Canada.15 As for the suggestion that Russia should diversify 
its relations, Venezuela accounted for 7 per cent of all arms 
exports from Russia in the period 2005-2009, and was Rus-
sia’s 4th largest recipient of arms.16 
China–Russia relations have been seen as more of a success. 
Since 2000, Russia has secured rapprochement with China 
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO 
serves as a multilateral forum cementing Chinese–Rus-
sian regional power interests in Central Asia, but it also 
serves to redress their mutual relationship and normalize 
it. Progress has also been made bilaterally. Important mile-
stones are the deal on the East Siberian Pacific Oil pipeline 
(ESPO) struck in 2008, and the delimitation agreement on 
the border along the Amur River. Moreover, Asia is a major 
market for Russian arms sales, accounting for 69 per cent 
of all conventional weapon sales in 2005–2009, much of 
which went to China. Russia has also been central in renew-
ing the Chinese submarine fleet. Russia exports worth USD 
26 billion went to China in the period from 1992 to 2006.17
 
Chinese economic growth and its considerable sovereign 
welfare funds (SWF) are both factors that potentially match 
Russia’s energy-driven economy well.18 These funds are in-
tertwined with the state and the banking system, and invest-
ments and loans are used to meet strategic needs for China. 
Problems are mounting, however. Russia’s export of arms to 
China has declined since 2006, and the ‘Chinese–Russian 
strategic energy partnership’ is suffering under a long on-
going dispute over gas prices. Starting from Putin’s visit to 
China in 2006, the building of a gas pipeline by Gazprom 
and CNPC was held up as the showpiece in a Russian–
Chinese strategic energy alliance. For China, the pipeline 
represented a strategic effort to reduce its dependence on 
gas from the Middle East and Africa (90 per cent of all im-
ports); for Russia, a gas pipeline with long-term deliveries 
at reasonable prices would reinforce state control over the 
unruly internal Eastern Siberian gas market. Since 2010, a 
price dispute has been pending, however, and when China 
and Russia were to sign multiple agreements on a strate-
gic partnership in oil and gas in September 2010, China 
did not accept the pricing mechanism.19 Also the celebrated 
strategic oil-relationship from 2008 has been precarious; 
when oil deliveries from the ESPO started in 2011, Rosneft 
and CNPC almost immediately clashed over prices on oil to 
China, Rosneft claiming unpaid bills of 40 billion USD for 
January 2011 alone.20 
The disagreement over price has been driven by the fact 
that China through the SCO has secured multiple inroads 
to Central Asian states and can cultivate beneficial bilat-
 9  Kommersant, 4 August 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1690100 
10  Kommersant, 20 September 2010, at: http://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/1498952 
11 Kommersant, 14 May 2010, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1368232?isSearch=True
12 Ibid. 
13 ‘Russia Building New Military Muscle Chopper’, World of Defence 
19 April 2011, at:   http://worldofdefense.blogspot.com/2011/04/
russia-building-new-military-chopper.html
14 ‘Brazil may delay Russian chopper order’, RP Defence, 15 April 
2011, at: http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-brazil-may-delay-
russian-chopper-order-71753356.html
15 SIPRI Yearbook, 2008, p. 308. 
16 SIPRI Yearbook, 2010, p. 292.
17 Lien (2012: 108).
18 The IMF estimated these funds to account for USD 6 trillion 
in 2007, with China holding one third of the total. Bremmer 
(2010: 71).
19 Russia stipulated building two pipelines, capable of delivering 63 
bcm annually, and China was willing to pay from USD 120 to 150 
per tcm. Russia insisted on adjusted global market prices, how-
ever, ranging from USD 180 to 220 per tcm – still lower than the 
European gas market price of USD 308 per tcm. Kommersant, 27 
September 2010.
20 Kommersant, 18 March 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1602609?isSearch=True
   2008 2009 2010 2011
Russia  5.2 –7.8 4.3 4.3
China  9.6 9.2 10.4 9.2
Brazil  5.2 –0.3 7.5 2.9
India  6.2 6.8 9.9 7.4
Average growth in GDP as compared to the year before
Source: Rosstat, 2011.
3eral relationships with them. The showpiece in this strat-
egy was the 2006 agreement to construct a Turkmenistan-
Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline. Turkmenistan 
carried the costs of building a first branch in 2007, and the 
first gas was delivered in 2009. By 2013, the capacity of this 
pipeline is to be 40 bcm annually, at a fixed low price of USD 
120–165 per tcm. In 2009, China offered Kazakhstan a USD 
10 billion credit against access to the strategic energy sec-
tor of the country. In 2011, China and Kazakhstan agreed to 
construct a third branch of the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-
Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline, with a capacity of 25 bcm 
annually, all while Russia and China failed to agree on gas 
prices.21 Also Uzbekistan, the second largest producer of gas 
in Central Asia after Turkmenistan (65 bcm gas annually) 
has been courting China. In 2010, Karimov signed a frame-
work agreement with CNPC to deliver 10 bcm annually to 
the gas pipeline.22 Moreover, in 2011, Karimov made a visit 
to China and secured promises of a USD 5 billion direct 
investment in the Uzbek energy and banking sector.23 
Russia has succeeded in bringing China in on some of its 
modernization projects. In 2011, while holding back on 
the strategic energy partnership due to the price disputes, 
Russia secured an agreement on setting up a green energy 
consortium with China on renewable bioenergy, as well as 
a consultative agreement with the Chinese Development 
Bank and the Chinese Bank of Trade and Commerce on ac-
cess to the Chinese bond market. Finally, China has set up a 
USD 5 billion credit line for the extraction of coal and miner-
als in the Baikal region and the development of hydropower 
projects.24 Still, this far from enough for Russia to match 
China’s rising competitiveness. Since 2006, no major arms 
export deals have been made with China, and China insists 
that the cooperation should shift to trade in high technol-
ogy, a move Russia has been resisting for obvious reasons: 
concerns that China will copy Russian technology for resale 
to third countries. 25 Since 2010, Russia has blocked the sales 
of engines for aircraft fighter FS-1 to China, as China uses 
these to equip the FS-1 and compete with the MiG-29.26  
China is no simple BRIC partner for Russia. As the only ac-
tor with significant economic strength to give direct credit 
lines to SCO members, China has the ability to put rewards 
behind support in the organization. For instance, the 2009 
credit-line deal with Kazakhstan was complemented by an-
other deal on swapping currencies (the tenge against the 
yuan) to the amount of USD 1 billion, thereby twinning the 
tenge and the yuan closer together.27 Interestingly, Russia 
has lobbied for India’s participation in the SCO to balance 
China.28 Also in the CIS region, China has increased its in-
vestments, ignoring Russia’s definition of this as a sphere 
of special interests. In 2011, China and Ukraine signed arms 
sales contracts and infrastructure investment contracts worth 
USD 2 billion, as well as a strategic partnership agreement, 
making Ukraine the third country in the CIS region with 
which China has such agreements (the others are Russia and 
Kazakhstan).29 China has also provided credits and grants to 
Customs Union member Belarus, with which Russia is for-
mally in a Union.30 This does not challenge Russia’s domi-
nant position, though. Before 2008, the EU had 38 per cent 
of Belarus’ trade, and Russia 33 per cent; since then, Russia’s 
share has grown to 47 per cent. In 2009 alone, Russia stood 
for 82.5 per cent of all FDI investments in Belarus.31  
India is the primary strategic partner for Russia in arms ex-
ports. Russia accounted for 77 per cent of all arms procure-
ments in India in the period from 2005 to 2009.32 According 
to Russian press data, India received one third of all arms 
exports in 2010, estimated at USD 16 billion.33 This includes 
aircraft (SU–30MKI, MiG-29K), T-90 tanks, artillery (Smer-
sh), and maritime missiles.34 True, Russia’s arms market has 
been under certain constraints. Firstly, the Russian–Indian 
relationship was put on hold in 2007, when India stopped 
financing the conversion of the aircraft carrier ‘Admiral 
Gorshkov’. According to the agreement struck in 2004, the 
company Sevmash was to convert the carrier for a price of 
USD 970 million, with an additional price tag of USD 650 
million for 16 aircraft to the carrier. India stopped financing 
the project in 2007, due to excessive expenditures, and a Sev-
mash corruption scandal surfaced in Russia over this deal in 
2011.35 Second, in April 2011, Russia lost the ‘contract of the 
century’ with India on the delivery of MiG-35 multipurpose 
fighters, to French Rafaele and Eurofighter. Finally, Russia 
also failed to meet the deadline for delivering three frigates to 
India in August 2011. The contract was signed in 2006, with 
deliveries scheduled to start from April 2011.36  
21 Kommersant, 17 June 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1661401?isSearch=True
22 Kommersant, 11 June, 2010, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1385399 
23 NeGa, 22 April 2011, at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2011-04-22/5_kari-
mov.html
24 Kommersant, 17 June 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1661401?isSearch=True 
25 Kommersant Vlast’, 14 March 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/1596785?isSearch=True  
26 The contract worth USD 238 million stipulated the sale of 100 
engines to China, and was signed in 2005. There was also a 
framework agreement on delivering 500 engines, whereby 
China could potentially buy 1000, with a contract reaching USD 
3.75 billion. These engines would equip the Chinese fighter FS-1, 
however, which competes with the Russian MiG-29. Apparently, 
however, the Russian agency allowed re-export of the engine to 
Egypt in 2007, and also to Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Al-
geria. On the other hand, Chinese and Russian arms trade have 
competed for markets in Turkey (anti-aircraft systems) and Thai-
land (BTRs). http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1407757
27 Kommersant 15 June 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1659838?isSearch=True 
28 Iran has also been flagged as potential SCO member, but ac-
cording to the SCO Charter any state under sanctions from the 
UNSC cannot be a member. 
29 The partnership agreement stipulates the rise of trade as a tar-
get: from USD 6.1 billion (2010) to 10 billion (2012). Kommersant, 
20 June 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1663411 
30 In September 2011, China pledged a USD 1 billion credit line to 
Minsk, and a USD 11 million grant. China also secured a frame-
work agreement with Belarus on Chinese investments in the pri-
vatization of Belarus industries. Kommersant, 26 September 2011, 
at: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1777892 and Racz (2010).
31 Racz (2010: 19–22). 
32 SIPRI Yearbook, 2010, p. 291. 
33 Kommersant Vlast’, 14 March 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.
ru/doc/1596785?isSearch=True 
34 Ibid.
35 Kommersant, 16 April 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1623356?isSearch=True
36 Kommersant, 25 August 2011, at: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/1757900?isSearch=True
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Despite this setback, the Russia–India strategic dialogues 
were renewed in October 2011. At a meeting with Prime Min-
ister Putin, decisions were made to resume a programme 
of joint military exercises (Indra-2011), and a modernization 
project for aircraft. As recently as in December 2011, Russia 
and India signed a government memorandum linked to ex-
isting contracts on the delivery of 42 Sukhoi-30 MKI fighter 
aircraft to India.37 This contract was hailed in the Russian 
press as a return to the Indian arms market after Russia 
had lost a tender to India in 2010. In January 2012, Russia 
also expanded the cooperation, agreeing to lease the nuclear 
submarine K-152 to India for 10 years.38  
In sum, Russia’s BRIC policies show strangely contradic-
tory patterns of wishful thinking (Brazil), realist balancing 
(China and India) and increasing competition and lack of 
leverage (China). Russia’s cultivation of multipolarity as a 
world order also offers little order to the CIS region, where 
states use China as a strategic partner while Russia tries 
to discipline smaller states. Questions remain as to wheth-
er the BRIC metaphor will have anything specific to offer 
Russia in terms of foreign policy dividends – or whether 
the concept is merely a smokescreen for hiding the deeper 
dependencies of Russia’s structural position in the interna-
tional system.
Conclusions
Will Russia’s BRIC association endure under the new 
presidency of Putin? Before late April 2012, Putin seemed 
in no rush to decide. He stayed on as Prime Minister un-
til his inauguration in May, while the lame duck president 
Medvedev represented Russia at the Delhi BRIC summit in 
April 2012. As of late April, however, a new ‘Asia strategy’ 
has been emerging. Putin will not attach any significance to 
the BRIC status, but will instead seek to define Russia’s for-
eign policy in terms of its strengths, not where it is doomed 
to underperform. Indeed, the adoption of a separate fund 
for infrastructure investments in the Far East has shown 
that Putin intend to focus on Asian affairs, and perhaps also 
on bilateral Chinese–Russian relations. Moreover, most of 
the economic planning documents of the government rec-
ognize both India and China as economic competitors, not 
partners.39 
What this means is another question. With his greater fo-
cus on national interests and security, Putin may well listen 
to what representatives from the security sector have been 
saying about the BRIC: that, in order to meet the challeng-
es from transatlantic structures, Russia ‘should fight dip-
lomatically, using the organizations of the UN, SCO, and 
BRIC, while at the same time improving the quality of Rus-
sian armaments.40 This statement seems accurate in at least 
one sense: In addition to energy resources, armaments are 
major tools in Russia’s status-seeking also along the BRIC 
axis, especially China and India. One brief conclusion also 
seems evident: Putin will seek to re-establish Russia’s influ-
ence as a producer and exporter of arms, and also as an en-
ergy power. These are also the main ingredients in Russia’s 
BRIC relations. And if Russia cannot make any meaningful 
contributions by calling itself a BRIC country, it might end 
up simply calling itself Russia. 
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